the digital person
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The Digital Person
Technology and Privacy in the Information Age

Daniel J. Solove
the digital person

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daniel j. solove
In loving memory of

my grandma,

Jean
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It is often said that books are written in solitude, but that wasn’t true for this one. The ideas in this book were created in conversation with many wise friends and mentors. I owe them immense gratitude. Michael Sullivan has had an enormous influence on my thinking, and he has continually challenged me to strengthen my philosophical positions. Paul Schwartz has provided countless insights, and his work is foundational for the understanding of privacy law. Both Michael’s and Paul’s comments on the manuscript have been indispensable. I also must thank Judge Guido Calabresi, Naomi Lebowitz, Judge Stanley Sporkin, and Richard Weisberg, who have had a lasting impact on the way I think about law, literature, and life.

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This book incorporates and builds upon some of my previously published work: Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stanford Law Review 1393 (2001); Access and Aggregation: Privacy, Public Records, and the Constitution, 86 Minnesota Law Review 1137 (2002); Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 Southern California Law Review 1083 (2002); and Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 Hastings Law Journal 1227 (2003). These articles are really part of a larger argument, which I am delighted that I can now present in its entirety. The articles are thoroughly revised, and parts of different articles are now intermingled with each other. The argument can now fully unfold and develop. Privacy issues continue to change at a rapid pace, and even though these articles were written not too long ago, they were in need of updating. The arguments originally made in these articles have been strengthened by many subsequent discussions about the ideas I proposed. I have been forced to think about many issues more carefully and with more nuance. My understanding of privacy is a work in progress, and it has evolved since I began writing about it. This book merely represents another resting place, not the final word.
The most widely discussed metaphor in the discourse of information privacy is George Orwell’s depiction of Big Brother in 1984. The use of the Big Brother metaphor to understand the database privacy problem is hardly surprising. Big Brother has long been the metaphor of choice to characterize privacy problems, and it has frequently been invoked when discussing police search tactics, wiretapping and video surveillance, and drug testing. It is no surprise, then, that the burgeoning discourse on information privacy has seized upon this metaphor.

With regard to computer databases, however, Big Brother is incomplete as a way to understand the problem. Although the Big Brother metaphor certainly describes particular facets of the problem, it neglects many crucial dimensions. This oversight is far from inconsequential, for the way we conceptualize a problem has important ramifications for law and policy.

The Importance of Metaphor

A metaphor, as legal scholar Steven Winter aptly defines it, “is the imaginative capacity by which we relate one thing to another.” In
their groundbreaking analysis, linguistics professor George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson observe that metaphors are not mere linguistic embellishments or decorative overlays on experience; they are part of our conceptual systems and affect the way we interpret our experiences.\(^5\) Metaphor is not simply an act of description; it is a way of conceptualization. “The essence of metaphor,” write Lakoff and Johnson, “is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”\(^6\)

Much of our thinking about a problem involves the metaphors we use. According to legal philosopher Jack Balkin, “metaphoric models selectively describe a situation, and in so doing help to suppress alternative conceptions.” Metaphors do not just distort reality but compose it; the “power [of metaphors] stems precisely from their ability to empower understanding by shaping and hence limiting it.”\(^7\)

Winter, as well as Lakoff and Johnson, focus on metaphors embodied in our thought processes, pervading the type of language we use.\(^8\) The metaphors I speak of are not as deeply ingrained. Metaphors are tools of shared cultural understanding.\(^9\) Privacy involves the type of society we are creating, and we often use metaphors to envision different possible worlds, ones that we want to live in and ones that we don’t. Orwell’s Big Brother is an example of this type of metaphor; it is a shared cultural narrative, one that people can readily comprehend and react to.

Ascribing metaphors is not only a descriptive endeavor but also an act of political theorizing with profound normative implications.\(^10\) According to Judge Richard Posner, however, “it is a mistake to try to mine works of literature for political or economic significance” because works of literature are better treated as aesthetic works rather than “as works of moral or political philosophy.”\(^11\) To the contrary, literature supplies the metaphors by which we conceptualize certain problems, and Posner fails to acknowledge the role that metaphor plays in shaping our collective understanding. Metaphors function not to render a precise descriptive representation of the problem; rather, they capture our concerns over privacy in a way that is palatable, potent, and compelling. Metaphors are instructive not for their realism but for the way they direct our focus to certain social and political phenomena.
George Orwell’s Big Brother

Orwell’s Totalitarian World. Journalists, politicians, and jurists often describe the problem created by databases with the metaphor of Big Brother—the harrowing totalitarian government portrayed in George Orwell’s 1984. Big Brother is an all-knowing, constantly vigilant government that regulates every aspect of one’s existence. In every corner are posters of an enormous face, with “eyes [that] follow you about when you move” and the caption “BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU.”

Big Brother demands complete obedience from its citizens and controls all aspects of their lives. It constructs the language, rewrites the history, purges its critics, indoctrinates the population, burns books, and obliterates all disagreeable relics from the past. Big Brother’s goal is uniformity and complete discipline, and it attempts to police people to an unrelenting degree—even their innermost thoughts. Any trace of individualism is quickly suffocated.

This terrifying totalitarian state achieves its control by targeting the private life, employing various techniques of power to eliminate any sense of privacy. Big Brother views solitude as dangerous. Its techniques of power are predominantly methods of surveillance. Big Brother is constantly monitoring and spying; uniformed patrols linger on street corners; helicopters hover in the skies, poised to peer into windows. The primary surveillance tool is a device called a “tele-screen” which is installed into each house and apartment. The tele-screen is a bilateral television—individuals can watch it, but it also enables Big Brother to watch them:

There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.

In 1984, citizens have no way of discovering if and when they are being watched. This surveillance, both real and threatened, is
combined with swift and terrifying force: “People simply disappeared, always during the night. Your name was removed from the registers, every record of everything you had ever done was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten.”

Orwell’s narrative brilliantly captures the horror of the world it depicts, and its images continue to be invoked in the legal discourse of privacy and information. “The ultimate horror in Orwell’s imagined anti-utopia,” observes sociologist Dennis Wrong, “is that men are deprived of the very capacity for cherishing private thoughts and feelings opposed to the regime, let alone acting on them.”

Panoptic Power. The telescreen functions similarly to the Panopticon, an architectural design for a prison, originally conceived by Jeremy Bentham in 1791. In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault provides a compelling description of this artifice of power:

> [A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building. . . . All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.

The Panopticon is a device of discipline; its goal is to ensure order, to prevent plots and riots, to mandate total obedience. The Panopticon achieves its power through an ingenious technique of surveillance, one that is ruthlessly efficient. By setting up a central observation tower from which all prisoners can be observed and by concealing from them any indication of whether they are being watched at any given time, “surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action.” Instead of having hundreds of patrols and watchpersons, only a few people need to be in the tower. Those in the tower can watch any inmate but they cannot be
seen. By always being visible, by constantly living under the reality that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the effects of surveillance into themselves. They obey not because they are monitored but because of their fear that they could be watched. This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control. The Panopticon is so efficient that nobody needs to be in the tower at all.

As Foucault observed, the Panopticon is not merely limited to the prison or to a specific architectural structure—it is a technology of power that can be used in many contexts and in a multitude of ways. In 1984, the telescreen works in a similar way to the Panopticon, serving as a form of one-way surveillance that structures the behavior of those who are observed. The collection of information in cyberspace can be readily analogized to the telescreen. As we surf the Internet, information about us is being collected; we are being watched, but we do not know when or to what extent.

The metaphor of Big Brother understands privacy in terms of power, and it views privacy as an essential dimension of the political structure of society. Big Brother attempts to dominate the private life because it is the key to controlling an individual's entire existence: her thoughts, ideas, and actions.

The Ubiquity of the Metaphor. Big Brother dominates the discourse of information privacy. In 1974, when the use of computer databases was in its infancy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas observed that we live in an Orwellian age in which the computer has become “the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a transparent world.”20 One state supreme court justice observed that the “acres of files” being assembled about us are leading to an “Orwellian society.”21

Academics similarly characterize the problem. In The Culture of Surveillance, sociologist William Staples observes that we have internalized Big Brother—we have created a Big Brother culture, where we all act as agents of surveillance and voyeurism.23 “The specter of Big Brother has haunted computerization from the beginning,” computer science professor Abbe Mowshowitz observes. “Computerized personal record-keeping systems, in the hands of police and intelligence agencies, clearly extend the surveillance capabilities of the state.”24
Commentators have adapted the Big Brother metaphor to describe the threat to privacy caused by private-sector databases, often referring to businesses as “Little Brothers.” As sociologist David Lyon puts it: “Orwell’s dystopic vision was dominated by the central state. He never guessed just how significant a decentralized consumerism might become for social control.” Legal scholar Katrin Byford writes: “Life in cyberspace, if left unregulated, thus promises to have distinct Orwellian overtones—with the notable difference that the primary threat to privacy comes not from government, but rather from the corporate world.” In *The End of Privacy*, political scientist Reg Whitaker also revises the Big Brother narrative into one of a multitude of Little Brothers.

Internet “surveillance” can be readily compared to Orwell’s telescreen. While people surf the web, companies are gathering information about them. As Paul Schwartz, a leading expert on privacy law, observes, the “Internet creates digital surveillance with nearly limitless data storage possibilities and efficient search possibilities.” Instead of one Big Brother, today there are a “myriad” of “Big and Little Brothers” collecting personal data.

Even when not directly invoking the metaphor, commentators frequently speak in its language, evoke its images and symbols, and define privacy problems in similar conceptual terms. Commentators view databases as having many of the same purposes (social control, suppression of individuality) and employing many of the same techniques (surveillance and monitoring) as Big Brother. David Flaherty, who served as the first Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, explains that the “storage of personal data can be used to limit opportunity and to encourage conformity.” Dossiers of personal information “can have a limiting effect on behavior.”

Oscar Gandy, a noted professor of communications and media studies, writes that “panopticism serves as a powerful metaphorical resource for representing the contemporary technology of segmentation and targeting.” As legal scholar Jerry Kang observes:

> [D]ata collection in cyberspace produces data that are detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and perma-
nent. Combine this with the fact that cyberspace makes data collection and analysis exponentially cheaper than in real space, and we have what Roger Clarke has identified as the genuine threat of “dataveillance.”

Dataveillance, as information technology expert Roger Clarke defines it, refers to the “systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons.” According to political scientist Colin Bennet, “[t]he term dataveillance has been coined to describe the surveillance practices that the massive collection and storage of vast quantities of personal data have facilitated.” Dataveillance is thus a new form of surveillance, a method of watching not through the eye or the camera, but by collecting facts and data. Kang argues that surveillance is an attack on human dignity, interfering with free choice because it “leads to self-censorship.” Likewise, Paul Schwartz claims that data collection “creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for free choice: the more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to force his obedience.”

According to this view, the problem with databases is that they are a form of surveillance that curtails individual freedom.

The Limits of the Metaphor. Despite the fact that the discourse appropriately conceptualizes privacy through metaphor and that the Big Brother metaphor has proven quite useful for a number of privacy problems, the metaphor has significant limitations for the database privacy problem. As illustrated by the history of record-keeping and databases in chapter 2, developments in record-keeping were not orchestrated according to a grand scheme but were largely ad hoc, arising as technology interacted with the demands of the growing public and private bureaucracies. Additionally, the goals of data collection have often been rather benign—or at least far less malignant than the aims of Big Brother. In fact, personal information has been collected and recorded for a panoply of purposes. The story of record-keeping and database production is, in the end, not a story about the progression toward a world ruled by Big Brother or a multitude of Little
Brothers. Instead, it is a story about a group of different actors with different purposes attempting to thrive in an increasingly information-based society.

The most significant shortcoming of the Big Brother metaphor is that it fails to focus on the appropriate form of power. The metaphor depicts a particular technique of power—surveillance. Certainly, monitoring is an aspect of information collection, and databases may eventually be used in ways that resemble the disciplinary regime of Big Brother. However, most of the existing practices associated with databases are quite different in character. Direct marketers wish to observe behavior so they can tailor goods and advertisements to individual differences. True, they desire consumers to act in a certain way (to purchase their product), but their limited attempts at control are far from the repressive regime of total control exercised by Big Brother. The goal of much data collection by marketers aims not at suppressing individuality but at studying it and exploiting it.

The most insidious aspect of the surveillance of Big Brother is missing in the context of databases: human judgment about the activities being observed (or the fear of that judgment). Surveillance leads to conformity, inhibition, and self-censorship in situations where it is likely to involve human judgment. Being observed by an insect on the wall is not invasive of privacy; rather, privacy is threatened by being subject to human observation, which involves judgments that can affect one's life and reputation. Since marketers generally are interested in aggregate data, they do not care about snooping into particular people's private lives. Much personal information is amassed and processed by computers; we are being watched not by other humans, but by machines, which gather information, compute profiles, and generate lists for mailing, emailing, or calling. This impersonality makes the surveillance less invasive.

While having one's actions monitored by computers does not involve immediate perception by a human consciousness, it still exposes people to the possibility of future review and disclosure. In the context of databases, however, this possibility is remote. Even when such data is used for marketing, marketers merely want to make a profit, not uproot a life or soil a reputation.
I do not, however, want to discount the dangerous effects of surveillance through the use of databases. Although the purposes of the users of personal data are generally not malignant, databases can still result in unintended harmful social effects. The mere knowledge that one’s behavior is being monitored and recorded certainly can lead to self-censorship and inhibition. Foucault’s analysis of surveillance points to a more subtle yet more pervasive effect: surveillance changes the entire landscape in which people act, leading toward an internalization of social norms that soon is not even perceived as repressive.37 This view of the effects of surveillance raises important questions regarding the amount of normalization that is desirable in society. While our instincts may be to view all normalization as an insidious force, most theories of the good depend upon a significant degree of normalization to hold society together.

Although the effects of surveillance are certainly a part of the database problem, the heavy focus on surveillance miscomprehends the most central and pernicious effects of databases. Understanding the problem as surveillance fails to account for the majority of our activities in the world and web. A large portion of our personal information involves facts that we are not embarrassed about: our financial information, race, marital status, hobbies, occupation, and the like. Most people surf the web without wandering into its dark corners. The vast majority of the information collected about us concerns relatively innocuous details. The surveillance model does not explain why the recording of this non-taboo information poses a problem. The focus of the surveillance model is on the fringes—and often involves things we may indeed want to inhibit such as cult activity, terrorism, and child pornography.

Digital dossiers do cause a serious problem that is overlooked by the Big Brother metaphor, one that poses a threat not just to our freedom to explore the taboo, but to freedom in general. It is a problem that implicates the type of society we are becoming, the way we think, our place in the larger social order, and our ability to exercise meaningful control over our lives.
Franz Kafka’s Trial

Kafka’s Distopic Vision. Although we cannot arbitrarily adopt new metaphors, we certainly can exercise control over the metaphors we use. Since understanding our current society is an ongoing process, not a once-and-done activity, we are constantly in search of new metaphors to better comprehend our situation.

Franz Kafka’s harrowing depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial captures dimensions of the digital dossier problem that the Big Brother metaphor does not.38 The Trial opens with the protagonist, Joseph K., awakening one morning to find a group of officials in his apartment, who inform him that he is under arrest. K. is bewildered at why he has been placed under arrest: “I cannot recall the slightest offense that might be charged against me. But even that is of minor importance, the real question is, who accuses me? What authority is conducting these proceedings?” When he asks why the officials have come to arrest him, an official replies: “You are under arrest, certainly, more than that I do not know.”39 Instead of taking him away to a police station, the officials mysteriously leave.

Throughout the rest of the novel, Joseph K. begins a frustrating quest to discover why he has been arrested and how his case will be resolved. A vast bureaucratic court has apparently scrutinized his life and assembled a dossier on him. The Court is clandestine and mysterious, and court records are “inaccessible to the accused.”40 In an effort to learn about this Court and the proceedings against him, Joseph K. scuttles throughout the city, encountering a maze of lawyers, priests, and others, each revealing small scraps of knowledge about the workings of the Court. In a pivotal scene, Joseph K. meets a painter who gleaned much knowledge of the obscure workings of the Court while painting judicial portraits. The painter explains to K.:

“The whole dossier continues to circulate, as the regular official routine demands, passing on to the highest Courts, being referred to the lower ones again, and then swinging backwards and forwards with greater or smaller oscillations, longer or shorter delays. . . . No document is ever lost, the Court never forgets anything. One day—quite unexpectedly—some Judge will take up
the documents and look at them attentively. . . .” “And the case begins all over again?” asked K. almost incredulously. “Certainly” said the painter.41

Ironically, after the initial arrest, it is Joseph K. who takes the initiative in seeking out the Court. He is informed of an interrogation on Sunday, but only if he has no objection to it: “Nevertheless he was hurrying fast, so as if possible to arrive by nine o’clock, although he had not even been required to appear at any specific time.”42 Although the Court has barely imposed any authority, not even specifying when Joseph K. should arrive for his interrogation, he acts as if this Court operates with strict rules and makes every attempt to obey. After the interrogation, the Court seems to lose interest in him. Joseph K., however, becomes obsessed with his case. He wants to be recognized by the Court and to resolve his case; in fact, being ignored by the Court becomes a worse torment than being arrested.

As K. continues his search, he becomes increasingly perplexed by this unusual Court. The higher officials keep themselves hidden; the lawyers claim they have connections to Court officials but never offer any proof or results. Hardly anyone seems to have direct contact with the Court. In addition, its “proceedings were not only kept secret from the general public, but from the accused as well.” Yet K. continues to seek an acquittal from a crime he hasn’t been informed of and from an authority he cannot seem to find. As Joseph K. scurries through the bureaucratic labyrinth of the law, he can never make any progress toward his acquittal: “Progress had always been made, but the nature of the progress could never be divulged. The Advocate was always working away at the first plea, but it had never reached a conclusion.”43 In the end, Joseph K. is seized by two officials in the middle of the night and executed.

Kafka’s The Trial best captures the scope, nature, and effects of the type of power relationship created by databases. My point is not that The Trial presents a more realistic descriptive account of the database problem than Big Brother. Like 1984, The Trial presents a fictional portrait of a harrowing world, often exaggerating certain elements of society in a way that makes them humorous and absurd. Certainly, in the United States most people are not told that they are inexplicably
under arrest, and they do not expect to be executed unexpectedly one evening. *The Trial* is in part a satire, and what is important for the purposes of my argument are the insights the novel provides about society through its exaggerations. In the context of computer databases, Kafka’s *The Trial* is the better focal point for the discourse than Big Brother. Kafka depicts an indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not knowing what is happening, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control over the process. This lack of control allows the trial to completely take over Joseph K.’s life. *The Trial* captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control over a vast dossier of details about one’s life. At any time, something could happen to Joseph K.; decisions are made based on his data, and Joseph K. has no say, no knowledge, and no ability to fight back. He is completely at the mercy of the bureaucratic process.

As understood in light of the Kafka metaphor, the primary problem with databases stems from the way the bureaucratic process treats individuals and their information.

**Bureaucracy.** Generally, the term “bureaucracy” refers to large public and private organizations with hierarchical structures and a set of elaborate rules, routines, and processes. I will use the term to refer not to specific institutions but to a particular set of practices—specifically, how bureaucratic processes affect and influence individuals subjected to them. Bureaucratic organization, sociologist Max Weber asserts, consists of a hierarchical chain-of-command, specialized offices to carry out particular functions, and a system of general rules to manage the organization. Bureaucracy is not limited to government administration; it is also a feature of business management. The modern world requires the efficient flow of information in order to communicate, to deliver goods and services, to regulate, and to carry out basic functions. According to Weber, bureaucracy is “capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings.” Bureaucratic processes are highly routinized, striving for increased efficiency, standardization of decisions, and the cultivation of specialization and expertise. As Paul Schwartz notes,
bureaucracy depends upon “vast quantities of information” that “relates to identifiable individuals.” 47 Much of this information is important and necessary to the smooth functioning of bureaucracies.

Although bureaucratic organization is an essential and beneficial feature of modern society, bureaucracy also presents numerous problems. Weber observes that bureaucracy can become “dehumanized” by striving to eliminate “love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.” 48 Bureaucracy often cannot adequately attend to the needs of particular individuals—not because bureaucrats are malicious, but because they must act within strict time constraints, have limited training, and are frequently not able to respond to unusual situations in unique or creative ways. Schwartz contends that because bureaucracy does not adequately protect the dignity of the people it deals with, it can “weaken an individual’s capacity for critical reflection and participation in society.” 49 Additionally, decisions within public and private bureaucratic organizations are often hidden from public view, decreasing accountability. As Weber notes, “[b]ureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can.” 50 Bureaucratic organizations often have hidden pockets of discretion. At lower levels, discretion can enable abuses. Frequently, bureaucracies fail to train employees adequately and may employ subpar security measures over personal data. Bureaucracies are often careless in their uses and handling of personal information.

The problem with databases emerges from subjecting personal information to the bureaucratic process with little intelligent control or limitation, which results in our not having meaningful participation in decisions about our information. Bureaucratic decision-making processes are being exercised ever more frequently over a greater sphere of our lives, and we have little power or say within such a system, which tends to structure our participation along standardized ways that fail to enable us to achieve our goals, wants, and needs.

**Bureaucracy and Power.** The power effects of this relationship to bureaucracy are profound; however, they cannot adequately be explained by resorting only to the understanding of power in Orwell’s
1984. Big Brother employs a coercive power that is designed to dominate and oppress. Power, however, is not merely prohibitive; as illustrated by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World*, it composes our very lives and culture. Huxley describes a different form of totalitarian society—one controlled not by force, but by entertainment and pleasure. The population is addicted to a drug called Soma, which is administered by the government as a political tool to sedate the people. Huxley presents a narrative about a society controlled not by a despotic coercive government like Big Brother, but by manipulation and consumption, where people participate in their own enslavement. The government achieves obedience through social conditioning, propaganda, and other forms of indoctrination. It does not use the crude coercive techniques of violence and force, but instead employs a more subtle scientific method of control—through genetic engineering, psychology, and drugs. Power works internally—the government actively molds the private life of its citizens, transforming it into a world of vapid pleasure, mindlessness, and numbness.

Despite the differences, power for both Orwell and Huxley operates as an insidious force employed for a particular design. *The Trial* depicts a different form of power. The power employed in *The Trial* has no apparent goal; any purpose remains shrouded in mystery. Nor is the power as direct and manipulative in design as that depicted by Orwell and Huxley. The Court system barely even cares about Joseph K. *The Trial* depicts a world that differs significantly from our traditional notions of a totalitarian state. Joseph K. was not arrested for his political views; nor did the Court manifest any plan to control people. Indeed, Joseph K. was searching for some reason why he was arrested, a reason that he never discovered. One frightening implication is that there was no reason, or if there were, it was absurd or arbitrary. Joseph K. was subjected to a more purposeless process than a trial. Indeed, the Court does not try to exercise much power over Joseph K. His arrest does not even involve his being taken into custody—merely a notification that he is under arrest—and after an initial proceeding, the Court makes no further effort even to contact Joseph K.

What is more discernible than any motive on the part of the Court or any overt exercise of power are the social effects of the power relationship between the bureaucracy and Joseph K. The power depicted
in *The Trial* is not so much a force as it is an element of relationships between individuals and society and government. These relationships have balances of power. What *The Trial* illustrates is that power is not merely exercised in totalitarian forms, and that relationships to bureaucracies which are unbalanced in power can have debilitating effects upon individuals—regardless of the bureaucracies’ purposes (which may, in fact, turn out to be quite benign).

Under this view, the problem with databases and the practices currently associated with them is that they disempower people. They make people vulnerable by stripping them of control over their personal information. There is no diabolical motive or secret plan for domination; rather, there is a web of thoughtless decisions made by low-level bureaucrats, standardized policies, rigid routines, and a way of relating to individuals and their information that often becomes indifferent to their welfare.

*The Interplay of the Metaphors.* The Kafka and Orwell metaphors are not mutually exclusive. As I will discuss in more depth in part III of this book, the interplay of the metaphors captures the problems with government access to digital dossiers. In particular, the government is increasingly mining data from private-sector sources to profile individuals. Information about people is observed or recorded and then fed into computer programs that analyze the data looking for certain behavior patterns common to criminal or terrorist activity. This method of investigation and analysis employs secret algorithms to process information and calculate how “dangerous” or “criminal” a person might be. The results of these secret computations have palpable effects on people’s lives. People can be denied the right to fly on an airplane without a reason or a hearing; or they can be detained indefinitely without the right to an attorney and without being told the reasons why.

In another example, political scientist John Giliom’s study of the surveillance of welfare recipients chronicles a world of constant observation coupled by an almost pathological bureaucracy. Recipients must fill out mountains of paperwork, answer endless questions, and be routinely monitored. Often, they receive so little financial assistance that they resort to odd jobs to obtain more income, which, if
discovered, could make them ineligible for benefits. The system creates a strong incentive for transgression, severe penalties for any breach, and elaborate data systems that attempt to detect any malfeasance through automated investigations. The system combines pervasive surveillance with a bureaucratic process that has little compassion or flexibility.

A quote by noted playwright and author Friedrich Dürrenmatt best captures how surveillance and bureaucracy interrelate in the Information Age:

[W]hat was even worse was the nature of those who observed and made a fool of him, namely a system of computers, for what he was observing was two cameras connected to two computers observed by two further computers and fed into computers connected to *those* computers in order to be scanned, converted, re-converted, and, after further processing by laboratory computers, developed, enlarged, viewed, and interpreted, by whom and where and whether at any point by human beings he couldn't tell.53

Surveillance generates information, which is often stored in record systems and used for new purposes. Being watched and inhibited in one's behavior is only one part of the problem; the other dimension is that the data is warehoused for unknown future uses. This is where Orwell meets Kafka.

**Beyond the Secrecy Paradigm**

Understanding the database privacy problem in terms of the Kafka metaphor illustrates that the problem with databases concerns the use of information, not merely keeping it secret. Traditionally, privacy problems have been understood as invasions into one's hidden world. Privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded by watching and by public disclosure of confidential information. I refer to this understanding of privacy as the “secrecy paradigm.” This paradigm is so embedded in our privacy discourse that privacy is often represented visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a person peeking through Venetian blinds.
Information about an individual, however, is often not secret, but is diffused in the minds of a multitude of people and scattered in various documents and computer files across the country. Few would be embarrassed by the disclosure of much of the material they read, the food they eat, or the products they purchase. Few would view their race, ethnicity, marital status, or religion as confidential. Of course, databases may contain the residue of scandals and skeletons—illicit websites, racy books, stigmatizing diseases—but since information in databases is rarely publicized, few reputations are tarnished. For the most part, the data is processed impersonally by computers without ever being viewed by the human eye. The secrecy paradigm focuses on breached confidentiality, harmed reputation, and unwanted publicity. But since these harms are not really the central problems of databases, privacy law often concludes that the information in databases is not private and is thus not entitled to protection. Indeed, one commentator defended DoubleClick’s tracking of web browsing habits by stating:

Over time, people will realize it’s not Big Brother who’s going to show up [at] your door in a black ski mask and take your kids away or dig deep into your medical history. This is a situation where you are essentially dropped into a bucket with 40 million people who look and feel a lot like you do to the advertising company.\(^{54}\)

This commentator, viewing privacy with the Big Brother metaphor, focuses on the wrong types of harms and implicitly views only secret information as private.

The problem with databases pertains to the uses and practices associated with our information, not merely whether that information remains completely secret. Although disclosure can be a violation of privacy, this does not mean that avoiding disclosure is the sum and substance of our interest in privacy. What people want when they demand privacy with regard to their personal information is the ability to ensure that the information about them will be used only for the purposes they desire. Even regarding the confidentiality of information, the understanding of privacy as secrecy fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things private from some people but not
others. The fact that an employee criticizes her boss to a co-worker does not mean that she wants her boss to know what she said.

Helen Nissenbaum, a professor of information technology, is quite right to argue that we often expect privacy even when in public.\(^5\) Not all activities are purely private in the sense that they occur in isolation and in hidden corners. When we talk in a restaurant, we do not expect to be listened to. A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication in a store open to the public, but certainly expects these purchases to be private activities. Contrary to the notion that any information in public records cannot be private, there is a considerable loss of privacy by plucking inaccessible facts buried in some obscure document and broadcasting them to the world on the evening news. Privacy can be infringed even if no secrets are revealed and even if nobody is watching us.

**The Aggregation Effect**

The digital revolution has enabled information to be easily amassed and combined. Even information that is superficial or incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals. Information breeds information. For example, although one’s SSN does not in and of itself reveal much about an individual, it provides access to one’s financial information, educational records, medical records, and a whole host of other information. As law professor Julie Cohen notes, “[a] comprehensive collection of data about an individual is vastly more than the sum of its parts.”\(^6\) I refer to this phenomenon as the “aggregation effect.” Similar to a Seurat painting, where a multitude of dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when aggregated paint a portrait of a person.

In the Information Age, personal data is being combined to create a digital biography about us. Information that appears innocuous can sometimes be the missing link, the critical detail in one’s digital biography, or the key necessary to unlock other stores of personal information. But why should we be concerned about a biography that includes details about what type of soap a person buys, whether she prefers Pepsi to Coca-Cola, or whether she likes to shop at Macy’s rather than Kmart? As legal scholar Stan Karas points out, the prod-
ucts we consume are expressive of our identities.\textsuperscript{57} We have many choices in the products we buy, and even particular brands symbolize certain personality traits and personal characteristics. Karas notes that Pepsi has marketed itself to a younger, more rebellious consumer than Coca-Cola, which emphasizes old-fashioned and traditional images in its advertisements.\textsuperscript{58} Whether punk, yuppie, or hippie, people often follow a particular consumption pattern that reflects the subculture with which they identify.\textsuperscript{59}

Of course, the products we buy are not wholly reflective of our identities. A scene from Henry James's \textit{Portrait of a Lady} best captures the complexities of the situation. Madame Merle, wise in the ways of the world yet jaded and selfish, is speaking to Isabel Archer, a young American lady in Europe full of great aspirations of living a bold and exceptional life, far beyond convention. Merle declares: “What shall we call our ‘self’? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us—and then it flows back again. I know a large part of myself is the clothes I choose to wear. I’ve a great respect for \textit{things}!” Isabel disagrees: “nothing that belongs to me is any measure of me.” “My clothes only express the dressmaker,” Isabel says, “but they don’t express me. To begin with, it is not my own choice that I wear them; they’ve been imposed upon me by society.”\textsuperscript{60}

Merle is obsessed by things, and she views herself as deeply intertwined with her possessions. The objects she owns and purchases are deeply constitutive of her personality. Isabel, in her proud individualism, claims that she is vastly distinct from what she owns and wears. Indeed, for her, things are a tool for conformity; they do not express anything authentic about herself.

Yet Madame Merle has a point—the information is indeed expressive. But Isabel is right, too—this information is somewhat superficial, and it only partially captures who we are. Although the digital biography contains a host of details about a person, it captures a distorted persona, one who is constructed by a variety of external details.\textsuperscript{61} Although the information marketers glean about us can be quite revealing, it still cannot penetrate into our thoughts and often only partially captures who we are.\textsuperscript{62} Information about our property, our professions, our purchases, our finances, and our medical history does not tell the whole story. We are more than the bits of data we give
off as we go about our lives. Our digital biography is revealing of ourselves but in a rather standardized way. It consists of bits of information pre-defined based on the judgment of some entity about what categories of information are relevant or important. We are partially captured by details such as our age, race, gender, net worth, property owned, and so on, but only in a manner that standardizes us into types or categories. Indeed, database marketers frequently classify consumers into certain categories based on stereotypes about their values, lifestyle, and purchasing habits. As Julie Cohen observes, people are not simply “reducible to the sum of their transactions, genetic markers, and other measurable attributes.”

Our digital biography is thus an unauthorized one, only partially true and very reductive. We must all live with these unauthorized biographies about us, the complete contents of which we often do not get to see. Although a more extensive dossier might be less reductive in capturing our personalities, it would have greater controlling effects on an individual’s life.

Not only are our digital biographies reductive, but they are often inaccurate. In today’s bureaucratized world, one of the growing threats is that we will be subject to the inadvertence, carelessness, and mindlessness of bureaucracy. A scene from the darkly humorous movie Brazil illustrates this problem. The movie opens with an exhausted bureaucrat swatting a fly, which inconspicuously drops into a typewriter, causes a jam, and results in him mistyping a letter in a person’s name on a form. The form authorizes the arrest and interrogation of suspected rebels. In the next scene, an innocent man peacefully sits in his home with his family when suddenly scores of armor-clad police storm inside and haul him away.

These dangers are not merely the imaginary stuff of movies. The burgeoning use of databases of public record information by the private sector in screening job applicants and investigating existing employees demonstrates how errors can potentially destroy a person’s career. For example, a Maryland woman wrongly arrested for a burglary was not cleared from the state’s criminal databases. Her name and SSN also migrated to a Baltimore County database relating to child protective services cases. She was fired from her job as a substitute teacher, and only after she could establish that the information
was in error was she rehired. When she later left that job to run a day care center for the U.S. military, she was subjected to questioning about the erroneous arrest. Later on, when employed at as a child care director at a YMCA, she was terminated when her arrest record surfaced in a background clearance check. Since she could not have the error expunged in sufficient time, the job was given to another person. Only after several years was the error finally cleared from the public records. As our digital biographies are increasingly relied upon to make important decisions, the problems that errors can cause will only escalate in frequency and magnitude.

To the extent that the digital biography is accurate, our lives are not only revealed and recorded, but also can be analyzed and investigated. Our digital biographies are being assembled by companies which are amassing personal information in public records along with other data. Collectively, millions of biographies can be searched, sorted, and analyzed in a matter of seconds. This enables automated investigations of individuals on a nationwide scale by both the government and the private sector. Increasingly, companies are conducting investigations which can have profound consequences on people's lives—such as their employment and financial condition. Employers are resorting to information brokers of public record information to assist in screening job applicants and existing employees. For example, the firm HireCheck serves over 4,000 employers to conduct background checks for new hires or current employees. It conducts a national search of outstanding arrest warrants; a SSN search to locate the person's age, past and current employers, and former addresses; a driver record search; a search of worker's compensation claims "to avoid habitual claimants or to properly channel assignments"; a check of civil lawsuit records; and searches for many other types of information. These investigations occur without any external oversight, and individuals often do not have an opportunity to challenge the results.

Forms of Dehumanization: Databases and the Kafka Metaphor

Expounding on the Kafka metaphor, certain uses of databases foster a state of powerlessness and vulnerability created by people's lack of
any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their personal information. Bureaucracy and power is certainly not a new problem. Databases do not cause the disempowering effects of bureaucracy; they exacerbate them—not merely by magnifying existing power imbalances but by transforming these relationships in profound ways that implicate our freedom. The problem is thus old and new, and its additional dimensions within the Information Age require extensive explication.

**Impoverished Judgments.** One of the great dangers of using information that we generally regard as private is that we often make judgments based on this private information about the person. As legal scholar Kenneth Karst warned in the 1960s, one danger of “a centralized, standardized data processing system” is that the facts stored about an individual “will become the only significant facts about the subject of the inquiry.”68 Legal scholar Jeffrey Rosen aptly observes, “Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge. True knowledge of another person is the culmination of a slow process of mutual revelation.”69

Increased reliance upon the easily quantifiable and classifiable information available from databases is having profound social effects. The nature and volume of information affects the way people analyze, use, and react to information. Currently, we rely quite heavily on quantifiable data: statistics, polls, numbers, and figures. In the law alone, there is a trend to rank schools; to measure the influence of famous jurists by counting citations to their judicial opinions;70 to assess the importance of law review articles by tabulating citations to them;71 to rank law journals with an elaborate system of establishing point values for authors of articles;72 and to determine the influence of academic movements by checking citations.73 The goal of this use of empirical data is to eliminate the ambiguity and incommensurability of many aspects of life and try to categorize them into neat, tidy categories. The computer has exacerbated this tendency, for the increase in information and the way computers operate furthers this type of categorization and lack of judgment.74 Indeed, in legal schol-
arship, much of this tendency is due to the advent of computer research databases, which can easily check for citations and specific terms.

In our increasingly bureaucratic and impersonal world, we are relying more heavily on records and profiles to assess reputation. As H. Jeff Smith, a professor of management and information technology, contends:

"[D]ecisions that were formerly based on judgment and human factors are instead decided according to prescribed formulas. In today's world, this response is often characterized by reliance on a rigid, unyielding process in which computerized information is given great weight. Facts that actually require substantial evaluation could instead be reduced to discrete entries in preassigned categories."^75

Certainly, quantifiable information can be accurate and serve as the best way for making particular decisions. Even when quantifiable information is not exact, it is useful for making decisions because of administrative feasibility. Considering all the variables and a multitude of incommensurate factors might simply be impossible or too costly.

Nevertheless, the information in databases often fails to capture the texture of our lives. Rather than provide a nuanced portrait of our personalities, compilations of data capture the brute facts of what we do without the reasons. For example, a record of an arrest without the story or reason is misleading. The arrest could have been for civil disobedience in the 1960s—but it is still recorded as an arrest with some vague label, such as “disorderly conduct.” It appears no differently from the arrest of a vandal. In short, we are reconstituted in databases as a digital person composed of data. The privacy problem stems paradoxically from the pervasiveness of this data—the fact that it encompasses much of our lives—as well as from its limitations—how it fails to capture us, how it distorts who we are.

*Powerlessness and Lack of Participation.* Privacy concerns an individual’s power in the elaborate web of social relationships that encompasses
her life. Today, a significant number of these relationships involve interaction with public and private institutions. In addition to the myriad of public agencies that regulate the products we purchase, the environment, and the like, we depend upon private institutions such as telephone companies, utility companies, Internet service providers, cable service providers, and health insurance companies. We also depend upon companies that provide the products we believe are essential to our daily lives: hygiene, transportation, entertainment, news, and so on. Our lives are ensconced in these institutions, which have power over our day-to-day activities (through what we consume, read, and watch), our culture, politics, education, and economic well-being. We are engaged in relationships with these institutions, even if on the surface our interactions with them are as rudimentary and distant as signing up for services, paying bills, and requesting repairs. With many firms—such as credit reporting agencies—we do not even take affirmative steps to establish a relationship.

Companies are beginning to use personal information to identify what business experts call “angel” and “demon” customers. Certain customers—the angels—are very profitable, but others—the demons—are not. Angel customers account for a large amount of a company’s business whereas demon customers purchase only a small amount of goods and services and are likely to cost the company money. For example, a demon customer is one who uses up a company’s resources by frequently calling customer service. Some business experts thus recommend that companies identify these types of customers through the use of personal information and treat them differently. For example, businesses might serve the angels first and leave the demons waiting; or they might offer the angels cheaper prices; or perhaps, they might even try to turn the demons away entirely. The result of companies moving in this direction is that people will be treated differently and may never know why. Even before the concept of angel and demon customers was articulated, one bank routinely denied credit card applications from college students majoring in literature, history, and art, based on the assumption that they would not be able to repay their debts. The bank’s practice remained a secret until the media ran a story about it.
We are increasingly not being treated as equals in our relationships with many private-sector institutions. Things are done to us; decisions are made about us; and we are often completely excluded from the process. With considerably greater frequency, we are ending up frustrated with the outcome. For example, complaints about credit reporting agencies to the Federal Trade Commission have been rapidly escalating, with 8,000 in 2001 and over 14,000 in 2002.79

Privacy involves the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having others control information that can affect whether an individual gets a job, becomes licensed to practice in a profession, or obtains a critical loan. It involves the ability to avoid the collection and circulation of such powerful information in one's life without having any say in the process, without knowing who has what information, what purposes or motives those entities have, or what will be done with that information in the future. Privacy involves the power to refuse to be treated with bureaucratic indifference when one complains about errors or when one wants certain data expunged. It is not merely the collection of data that is the problem—it is our complete lack of control over the ways it is used or may be used in the future.

Problematic Information Gathering Techniques. This powerlessness is compounded by the fact that the process of information collection in America is clandestine, duplicitous, and unfair. The choices given to people over their information are hardly choices at all. People must relinquish personal data to gain employment, procure insurance, obtain a credit card, or otherwise participate like a normal citizen in today's economy. Consent is virtually meaningless in many contexts. When people give consent, they must often consent to a total surrender of control over their information.

Collection of information is often done by misleading the consumer. General Electric sent a supposedly anonymous survey to shareholders asking them to rate various aspects of the company. Unbeknownst to those surveyed, the survey's return envelope was coded so that the responses could be matched to names in the company's shareholder database.80

Some information is directly solicited via registration questionnaires or other means such as competitions and sweepstakes. The
warranty registration cards of many products—which ask a host of lifestyle questions—are often sent not to the company that makes the product but to National Demographics and Lifestyles Company at a Denver post office box. This company has compiled information on over 20 million people and markets it to other companies.\textsuperscript{81} Often, there is an implicit misleading notion that consumers must fill out a registration questionnaire in order to be covered by the warranty.

Frequent shopper programs and discount cards—which involve filling out a questionnaire and then carrying a special card that provides discounts—enable the scanner data to be matched to data about individual consumers.\textsuperscript{82} This technique involves offering savings in return for personal information and the ability to track a person's grocery purchases.\textsuperscript{83} However, there are scant disclosures that such an exchange is taking place, and there are virtually no limits on the use of the data.

Conde Nast Publications Inc. (which publishes the \textit{New Yorker}, \textit{Vanity Fair}, \textit{Vogue}, and other magazines) recently sent out a booklet of 700 questions asking detailed information about an individual's hobbies, shopping preferences, health (including medications used, acne problems, and vaginal/yeast infections), and much more. Almost 400,000 people responded. In return for the data, the survey said: "Just answer the questions below to start the conversation and become part of this select group of subscribers to whom marketers listen first." Conde Nast maintains a database of information on 15 million people. Stephen Jacoby, the vice president for marketing and databases, said: "What we're trying to do is enhance the relationship between the subscriber and their magazine. In a sense, it's a benefit to the subscriber."\textsuperscript{84}

There is no "conversation" created by supplying the data. Conde Nast does not indicate how the information will be used. It basically tries to entice people to give information for a vague promise of little or no value. While the company insists that it will not share information with "outsiders," it does not explain who constitutes an "outsider." The information remains in the control of the company, with no limitations on use. Merely informing the consumer that data may be sold to others is an inadequate form of disclosure. The consumer
does not know how many times the data will be resold, to whom it will be sold, or for what purposes it will be used.

Irresponsibility and Carelessness. A person’s lack of control is exacerbated by the often thoughtless and irresponsible ways that bureaucracies use personal information and their lack of accountability in using and protecting the data. In other words, the problem is not simply a lack of individual control over information, but a situation where nobody is exercising meaningful control over the information.

In bureaucratic settings, privacy policy tends to fall into drift and be reactionary. In a detailed study of organizations such as banks, insurance companies, and credit reporting agencies, H. Jeff Smith concluded that all of the organizations “exhibited a remarkably similar approach: the policy-making process, which occurred over time, was a wandering and reactive one.” According to a senior executive at a health insurance company, “We’ve been lazy on the privacy [issues] for several years now, because we haven’t had anybody beating us over the head about them.” According to Smith, most executives in the survey were followers rather than leaders: “[M]ost executives wait until an external threat forces them to consider their privacy policies.”

Furthermore, there have been several highly publicized instances where companies violated their own privacy policies. Although promising its users that their information would remain confidential, the website GeoCities collected and sold information about children who played games on the site. RealNetworks, Inc. secretly collected personal information about its users in direct violation of its privacy policy. And a website for young investors promised that the data it collected about people’s finances would remain anonymous, but instead it was kept in identifiable form.

More insidious than drifting and reactionary privacy policies are irresponsible and careless uses of personal information. For example, Metromail Corporation, a seller of direct marketing information, hired inmates to enter the information into databases. This came to light when an inmate began sending harassing letters that were sexually explicit and filled with intimate details of people’s lives. A television reporter once paid $277 to obtain from Metromail a list of over
5,000 children living in Pasadena, California. The reporter gave the
name of a well-known child molester and murderer as the buyer. These cases illustrate the lack of care and accountability by the cor-
porations collecting the data.

McVeigh v. Cohen best illustrates this problem. A highly decorated
17-year veteran of the Navy sought to enjoin the Navy from discharg-
ing him under the statutory policy known as “Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
Don't Pursue.” When responding to a toy drive for the crew of his
ship, Tim McVeigh (no relation to the Oklahoma City bomber) acci-
dentally used the wrong email account, sending a message under the
alias “boysrch.” He signed the email “Tim” but included no other in-
formation. The person conducting the toy drive searched through the
member profile directory of America Online (AOL), where she learned
that “boysrch” was an AOL subscriber named Tim who lived in Hawaii
and worked in the military. Under marital status, he had identified
himself as “gay.” The ship’s legal adviser began to investigate, suspect-
ing that “Tim” was McVeigh. Before speaking to McVeigh, and without
a warrant, the legal adviser had a paralegal contact AOL for more in-
formation. The paralegal called AOL’s toll-free customer service num-
ber and, without identifying himself as a Navy serviceman, concocted
a story that he had received a fax from an AOL customer and wanted
to confirm who it belonged to. Despite a policy of not giving out per-
sonal information, the AOL representative told him that the customer
was McVeigh. As a result, the Navy sought to discharge McVeigh.

In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a man named Liam Youens be-
gan purchasing information about Amy Lynn Boyer from a company
called Docusearch. He requested Boyer’s SSN, and Docusearch ob-
tained it from a credit reporting agency and provided it to him.
Youens then requested Boyer’s employment address, so Docusearch
hired a subcontractor, who obtained it by making a “pretext” phone
call to Boyer. By lying about her identity and the reason for the call,
the subcontractor obtained the address from Boyer. Docusearch then
gave the address to Youens, who went to Boyer’s workplace and shot
and killed her. Docusearch supplied the information without ever
asking who Youens was or why he was seeking the information.

Within the past few years, explicit details of 90 psychotherapy pa-
tients’ sex lives, as well as their names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, and credit card numbers, were inadvertently posted on the Internet. A banker in Maryland who sat on a state's public health commission checked his list of bank loans with records of people with cancer in order to cancel the loans of the cancer sufferers. A hacker illegally downloaded thousands of patients' medical files along with their SSNs from a university medical center. Due to a mix-up, a retirement plan mailed financial statements to the wrong people at the same firm. Extensive psychological records describing the conditions of over 60 children were inadvertently posted on the University of Montana's website. An employee of a company obtained 30,000 credit reports from a credit reporting agency and peddled them to others for use in fraud and identity theft. Health information and SSNs of military personnel and their families were stolen from a military contractor's database.

In sum, the privacy problem created by the use of databases stems from an often careless and unconcerned bureaucratic process—one that has little judgment or accountability—and is driven by ends other than the protection of people's dignity. We are not just heading toward a world of Big Brother or one composed of Little Brothers, but also toward a more mindless process—of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization—a world that is beginning to resemble Kafka's vision in *The Trial.*